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Abstract
Epidemic spread in single-host systems strongly depends on the population’s
contact network. However, little is known regarding the spread of epidemics
across networks representing populations of multiple hosts. We explored
cross-species transmission in a multilayer network where layers represent
populations of two distinct hosts, and disease can spread across intralayer
(within-host) and interlayer (between-host) edges. We developed an analytic
framework for the SIR epidemic model to examine the effect of (i) source
of infection and (ii) between-host asymmetry in infection probabilities, on
disease risk. We measured risk as outbreak probability and outbreak size in
a focal host, represented by one network layer. Numeric simulations were
used to validate the analytic formulations. We found that outbreak prob-
ability is determined by a complex interaction between source of infection
and between-host infection probabilities, whereas outbreak size is mainly af-
fected by the non-focal host to focal host infection probability alone. Hence,
inter-specific asymmetry in infection probabilities shapes disease dynamics
in multihost networks. These results expand current theory of monolayer
networks, where outbreak size and probability are considered equal, high-
lighting the importance of considering multiple measures of disease risk.
Our study advances understanding of multihost systems and non-biological
systems with asymmetric flow rates.
Key words: Cross-species, Ecology, Host diversity, Host richness, Multi-
layer networks, Multihost
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1 Introduction
Network models are commonly used to study disease transmission in human
and animal populations because they consider heterogeneities in the con-
tact structure of populations [1–3]. However, most network models assume
that the network is not connected to other networks, while in the real world,
isolated networks are the exception rather than the rule. For example, in hu-
mans, diseases can spread through interconnected transportation networks,
or through interconnected social groups.
One way to model disease spread across several networks is with mul-
tilayer networks, in which different layers can represent different popula-
tions. In particular, interconnected networks (as defined by [4]) are a useful
representation because they contain two types of edges: intralayer edges
connect individuals from the same population, while interlayer edges con-
nect individuals from different populations (Fig. 1). Disease transmission
in interconnected networks has been explored in the field of physics, and
driven by human-related examples (reviewed in [4–6]). The focus of virtu-
ally all previous studies has been on patterns of interlayer connectivity and
the distribution of intralayer vs. interlayer edges in the network, which is
the main characteristic differentiating interconnected systems from single-
network systems [4–6]. For example, Saumell-Mendiola et al. [7] have shown
that when the correlation between the intralayer and interlayer degree dis-
tributions is strong, an outbreak may occur in the system even if it would
not have occurred in any of the single layers alone.
Despite the focus on human-related systems, it is important to note the
tremendous effects of pathogen transmission in interconnected non-human
systems. In nature, populations of the same or different species intercon-
nect in ways that allow for pathogen exchange, including predation [8], shar-
ing space [9, 10] and sharing food sources [11]. In particular, cross-species
transmission has attracted much attention due to its possible impact on
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agriculture (e.g., transmission between wildlife and domestic animals), per-
sistence of wild populations, and species conservation efforts [12–15]. For
example, white-nose syndrome, induced by the fungus Pseudogymnoascus
destructans, which invaded North America from Europe, is causing major
declines in bat populations of several species [15, 16]. From a public health
perspective, cross-species transmission of zoonotic diseases between animals
and humans has been a major focus in disease ecology [17, 18], with notable
examples such as avian influenza and Ebola [19, 20]. However, to date,
cross-species pathogen transmission has not been studied within a network
analysis framework [13, 21–23] (but see [24]).
Here, we bring together the theoretical aspects of both the physics of
infection processes on interconnected networks and of the disease ecology
of multihost systems. We adopt an ecological point of view according to
which an isolated network represents a population of a particular host species
while an interconnected network represents a multihost system composed of
populations of distinct host species (Fig. 1). This view is both realistic and
necessary because (i) in multihost systems one host can alter the dynamics of
pathogens in other hosts [13, 21–23] and (ii) these dynamics can be affected
by the underlying network structure of each host.
In disease ecology, one type of multihost pathogen transmission models
focuses on the case in which a target species is infected by a source species
[13, 25]. In this type of models, little or no transmission from the target
back to the source is assumed [22, 25]. A second kind of models deals
with diseases that can be transmitted and maintained by more than one
species (e.g., bovine tuberculosis or canine distempr virus). In this case,
the dynamics of disease in the host of interest, which we term the focal host,
may be affected by two critical factors inherent to multihost systems: (i) the
source of infection—if the disease originates in the focal host itself or in a
non-focal host; and (ii) the asymmetry in the rate of transmission between
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the two hosts. Both of these factors are of crucial importance for cross-
species pathogen transmission [9, 13, 22]. For example, recurrent infections
from a non-focal host can cause endemic infection in a focal host even if
the pathogen cannot establish in it [13]. Additionally, in zoonotic diseases
the source of infection is the animal, rather than the human, causing strong
asymmetry in infection dynamics; that is, probability of infection is higher
from an animal species to humans than the other way around [18, 26].
Our aim is to understand how the interaction between these two factors
affects disease dynamics in an interconnected network system. We quantify
dynamics using two measures: (i) The probability of an outbreak (i.e., a
significant portion of the population is infected). (ii) The expected size of an
outbreak (i.e., the proportion of the population infected), when an outbreak
occurs. We address this aim by developing a novel analytic framework to
quantify outbreak size and probability in interconnected networks, and by
simulating disease spread.
2 Modelling pathogen spread in interconnected net-
works
Following previous studies on interconnected networks [7, 27, 28], we use
interconnected networks as depicted in Fig. 1. We refer to each of the
single networks in an interconnected network as layers [4]. Intralayer edges
connect nodes within a layer while interlayer edges connect nodes from
different layers. For simplicity, we considered the case of two interconnected
populations (belonging to different hosts). We explore disease dynamics in
layer A (LA) of the interconnected network and thus consider LA as our
focal host species and layer B (LB) as the non-focal species (Fig. 1). We
define the mean number of interlayer edges connected to a node (or ‘mean
interlayer degree’) in LA as eA =
E
nA
, where E is the number of interlayer
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edges and nA is the number of nodes in LA. The mean interlayer degree of
a node in LB is analogously defined as eB =
E
nB
.
We study the spread of a pathogen in interconnected networks with an
SIR model, in which each individual belongs to one of three compartments:
susceptible (S), infected and thus infectious (I) or resistant and not infectious
(R). It is advantageous to work with the SIR model because it is relevant
for a vast range of diseases and because it is well established in the network
epidemiology literature [3], providing us with a sound theoretical basis to
build upon.
Following [29], we denote the probability that a contact between an
infectious and a susceptible individual leads to successful transmission of
infection in a given time step as β (this is the equivalent of ν from Begon
et al. [29]). We hereafter refer to this parameter as infection probability.
Because nodes in different layers belong to different species, the probability
that a susceptible individual will be infected by an infectious neighbour is
determined by the species identity of both. Hence, β depends on the layers
to which the two nodes belong [22]. We thus defined the infection matrix
β =
 βAA βAB
βBA βBB
 (1)
For example, βAB is the probability that a node in LA will be infected
by a node from LB. Individuals move from an infected state to a recovered
state after a given amount of time steps (the infectious period, τ), and the
recovery rate is therefore γ = 1τ (sensu [30]).
We use the SIR model to examine two infection scenarios. In Scenario
1 the epidemic originates with an individual in LA (the focal host) whereas
in Scenario 2 it originates with an individual in LB (the non-focal host). In
both scenarios we track only the population of the focal host.
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3 Analytic formulation of outbreak size and prob-
ability
The SIR spreading process on a network can be analytically studied by
equating it with a bond percolation process [1, 31]. The bond percolation
problem concerns diffusion through a discrete substrate to form clusters. In
monolayer (non interconnected) networks, the probability of a large outbreak
and the expected size of such an outbreak in arbitrary random networks (ran-
dom networks with any degree distribution) has been described by Newman
[32]. A percolation process on a network of size n may be subcritical, in
which case the diffusion occurs only in small clusters or components, which
are of size in the order of log(n). Alternatively, it can be supercritical, in
which case a giant component emerges, with size in the order of n, and pos-
sibly other small non-giant components. An outbreak can occur only when
the system is in the supercritical phase; in epidemiological terms, this means
that the disease crosses the R0 > 1 threshold. Because we are interested in
those settings where an epidemic may potentially have serious consequences
for populations, we focus on scenarios in the supercritical phase.
The transmissibility of the pathogen via a given edge depends on both
the infection probability and the recovery rate and is T = 1− (1−β) 1γ . This
property is a measure of the likelihood that the disease will be transmitted
via a given edge if one of the nodes adjacent to it is infected. Transmissi-
bility allows evaluating the size of an outbreak, if one occurs, by estimating
the expected size of the giant component (i.e., the expected fraction of the
network occupied by the giant component) in the percolation process on
the network [31, 32]. For a large random network with an arbitrary degree
distribution, both the size of the giant component, S, and the mean size
of the non-giant components, s, can be calculated using percolation theory
(see Supplementary Information). Thus, an outbreak occurs when the epi-
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demic originates in an individual in the giant component and spreads to the
entire giant component. The probability that an epidemic starting in a ran-
dom individual will result in an outbreak, P , is the same as the probability
of belonging to the giant component, and thus in monolayer networks P = S
[31, 32].
Applying percolation theory to interconnected networks is not straight-
forward, particularly when the infection probability is asymmetric (βAB 6=
βBA). While the percolation process can describe the SIR dynamics in
each of the layers separately (as for monolayer networks), the pathogen
spreads across the interlayer edges with different probabilities in each direc-
tion. Therefore, there is no single transmissibility value for the interlayer
edges, and the problem of finding the outbreak probability and size cannot
be formulated as a simple percolation process. To provide approximation
for outbreak size and probability in interconnected networks, we start by
considering the percolation processes in each layer independently, as if they
were disconnected. On top of that, we add the effect of the other layer for
increasing the probability and size of outbreaks.
We assume (Assumption 1) that an epidemic in one layer will inevitably
lead to an epidemic in the second layer, since the layers are sufficiently
connected. This means that there are enough interlayer edges connecting
the layers, and that the interlayer transmission probabilities are not too close
to zero. Next, we consider the nature of the multihost setting. First, due to
behavioral and life history differences between species, within-host contact
rates are usually greater than between-host contact rates. Second, once two
individuals come in contact, within-host infection probabilities are larger
than within-host infection probabilities due to physiological competence of
the host and the pathogen [13, 21, 33]. With this in mind, we assume
(assumption 2) that one interlayer edge at most is expected to transmit the
disease to or from each non-giant component.
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3.1 Probability of outbreak in interconnected networks
We wish to find the analytic solution to PA — the probability of an outbreak
in layer LA. The probability of an outbreak in each of the layers if the
interlayer edges are epidemiologically disconnected (i.e., βAB = 0 and βBA =
0) is the same as the size of the giant component in the percolation process
in these layers; we denote these sizes as SA and SB. We further denote sA
and sB as the mean number of nodes in the non-giant components in layers
A and B, respectively, when the layers are disconnected. Note that SA and
SB are measured as a fraction of the network size, while sA and sB are
measured in absolute number of nodes, rather than in fractions. When the
layers are connected, the transmissibility of the pathogen from LA to LB
via the interlayer edges is TAB = 1− (1− βAB)
1
γA , where γA is the recovery
rate of the host in LA. This gives the probability that the pathogen spreads
from an infected individual in LA to a connected individual in LB through a
given interlayer edge. TBA is analogously defined as TBA = 1− (1−βBA)
1
γB .
In Scenario 1, an outbreak may occur as a result of intralayer trans-
missions within LA if the node of origin belongs to the giant component.
Alternatively, if the node of origin is not in the giant component, an epi-
demic may occur as a result of transmission to LB causing an outbreak
there which is then transmitted back to LA. This will occur if (i) the non-
giant component in which the disease originated is connected to LB via an
interlayer edge (with expected value eAsA). (ii) The interlayer edge trans-
mits the disease to LB (with probability TAB). (iii) The node to which the
pathogen is transmitted is in the giant component in LB (with probability
SB). Therefore, in Scenario 1
PA = SA + (1− SA)SBeAsATAB. (2)
The first term in the equation refers to the case in which disease orig-
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inates in the giant component whereas the second term refers to the con-
currence of the three conditions mentioned, in the case where the disease
originates in the non-giant component. We see that the probability of an
outbreak depends only on the interlayer edge transmissibility in the direc-
tion LA → LB. This is so because the infection in the other direction will
occur if there is an outbreak in LB, regardless of the transmissibility of the
epidemic in the direction LB → LA (due to assumption 1).
In scenario 2, the disease originates in LB and the logic is analogous.
An outbreak will occur in LA if an outbreak occurs in LB. Alternatively, if
an outbreak does not occur in LB, but (i) the non-giant component infected
in LB is connected with an interlayer edge (with expected value eBsB), (ii)
this connecting edge transmits the epidemic (with probability TBA), and
(iii) the infection in LA results in an outbreak (with probability SA). The
probability of an outbreak in this scenario is therefore:
PA = SB + (1− SB)SAeBsBTBA. (3)
3.2 Outbreak size in interconnected networks
While in monolayer networks the size and probability of an outbreak are the
same (S = P ), this is not the case in interconnected networks, as we show
below. In scenario 1, the size of an outbreak in LA, which we will denote as
RA∞, is augmented by the possible infection of the non-giant components in
the percolation process on that layer. Since we assume an outbreak occurs
in LA, an outbreak must occur in LB as well. The giant-component in LB
may be connected via interlayer edges to non-giant component in LA which
may now become infected. The number of interlayer edges connected to
the giant component in LB is SBeBnB, of which 1 − SA are connected to
non-giant components in LA. Each such infection in LA increases the size
of the outbreak by sAnA (due to assumption 2). Therefore,
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RA∞ = SA + SB(1− SA)sAeB
nB
nA
TBA
= SA + SB(1− SA)sAeATBA
(4)
Notice that equation 4 is different from both equations 2 and 3, and only
transmission in the direction LB → LA plays a role.
For scenario 2 the formulation is similar. Since we assume that an out-
break occurs in LA, it is of no significance to the outbreak size where the
epidemic originated, since an outbreak must occur in LB. Therefore, LB
augments the outbreak in LA in a similar manner as for Scenario 1, and
equation 4 holds in this case as well. Therefore (and in contrast to the prob-
ability of an epidemic), only transmission rates in the direction LA → LB
affect outbreak size, regardless of the source of the epidemic.
4 Numeric simulations of the spreading process
To test the analytic solutions, we compared them with numeric simulations.
We used the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) model as it is commonly considered as a ‘null’
network structure and because for the purpose of theoretical work, which
aims to provide a general framework to generate predictions, the use of well-
defined network models is advantageous [34]. We find explicit solutions for
the ER model (see the Supplementary Information for derivation of S and
s for ER networks), and compare them to simulation results. Nonetheless,
real animal or human networks do not necessarily fit into predefined models
and our analytic framework can be used with any network structure.
Following [27, 28, 35], we generated two ER networks of size n = 1000
and a mean degree of K = 10, and connected them with E = 1000 interlayer
edges. That is, on average, every node in layer A connects to one node in
layer B (eA = eB = 1). Although in some systems it may be logical or
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necessary to connect nodes between layers non-uniformly (e.g., preferentially
connecting between nodes with highest intralayer node degree), Wang &
Xiao [36] have shown that such non-random interlayer connectivity leads
to similar dynamics as with random connectivity. We therefore connected
nodes randomly between LA and LB.
In multihost systems, infection probability is usually assumed to be lower
(or equal, at most) between species than within-species [13, 21]. We there-
fore considered βAB, βBA ≤ βAA = βBB = 0.03. We tested for the effect of
asymmetry in infection probability by varying βAB and βBA from 0 to 0.03
(including) in increments of 0.0005, resulting in 61× 61 = 3721 (βAB, βBA)
combinations. For each (βAB, βBA) combination, we randomly generated
100 interconnected networks, each of which was infected 1000 times, result-
ing in 100,000 simulations per combination. We set τA = τB = 6. Each
simulation was run until there were no more infected individuals. In each
simulation, we calculated r∞ — the final proportion of individuals in layer
LA (the focal host) who were infected at some point during the simulation.
We then calculated two properties for each (βAB, βBA) combination: (i) The
probability of an outbreak, Pe, defined as the proportion of simulations (out
of 100,000) in which the pathogen infected more than 10% of the popu-
lation. While the selection of 10% is arbitrary, the exact value does not
change the results. This is due to the strong bi-modality in the infection
process, which is a consequence of the two types of components—giant and
non-giant—rather than a continous distribution of componenet sizes [31].
We compare Pe to PA calculated using the analytic solution. (ii) Outbreak
size—the mean number of individuals infected in those simulations that have
passed the 10% threshold, R∞. We compare R∞ to RA∞ calculated using
the analytic solution. Note that we use normal letters for notation of ana-
lytic parameters (e.g., PA) and calligraphic letters for notation of parameters
related to the simulations (e.g., Pe).
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Our choice of parameter values for the numerical simulations was made
to facilitate the way we illustrate the analytic approach (we discuss the diver-
gence of numerical simulations from analytic solutions below). The analytic
framework is flexible enough to allow for any choice of parameters which
satisfy our assumptions. For example, one could choose unequal infection
probabilities or recovery rates for the two layers or other range of values for
βAB, βBA.
4.1 Effect on the probability of an outbreak
Equations 2 and 3 predict that the probability of an outbreak in the focal
species, PA, will strongly depend on the source of infection. This is so be-
cause these two equations differ in their parameters. Accordingly, we find
in the simulations that when the disease originates in the focal host (LA),
βAB determines Pe to a large extent (Fig. 2a), whereas when the disease
originates in LB, Pe is determined almost exclusively by βBA (Fig. 2b). The
reversal of the roles of βBA and βAB with different source of infections is
illustrated by observing horizontal and vertical ‘cross-sections’ across the
βAB − βBA space (Fig. 3). It is evident from Fig. 3a that Pe increases ap-
proximately linearly with increasing βAB, whereas it remains rather constant
with changes in βBA. The opposite pattern is evident in Fig. 3b, where Pe
increases approximately linearly with an increase in βBA but almost does
not change with βAB.
The emergence of this behaviour is explained as follows. If an outbreak
did not occur in the source layer (which can be either LA or LB), then there
must be transmission from the source to the non-source layer (the terms on
the right in equations 2 and 3) for an outbreak to still occur in LA. This
transmission is a function of the probability of infection from the source
layer to the non-source layer. Once the infection traversed between layers,
there are two options: (i) there is no outbreak in the non-source layer and
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the epidemic dies out (re-transmission back to the source layer is negligible
due to assumption 2). (ii) There is an outbreak and transmission back to
the source layer is almost certain. In this case the infection probability from
the non-source to the source layer plays no role. Hence, both the source
of infection and the asymmetry in interlayer transmission determine the
behaviour of Pe.
4.2 Effect on outbreak size
In contrast to the marked qualitative effect of the source of infection on Pe,
it does not seem to have any major qualitative effect on the behaviour of
R∞ (Fig. 2c,d and Fig. 3c,d). The cross-sections show that R∞ increases
approximately linearly as βBA increases but remains almost unaffected by
βAB, regardless of the source of infection. This is so because R∞ is condi-
tioned on an outbreak already occurring in LA, and hence also in LB. The
additional increase in R∞ (compared to the case where it is a monolayer
network) is due to infections from the giant component in LB to non-giant
components in LA (again, under our assumptions back-transmission from
non-giant components in negligible). Therefore, the source of infection has
no affect on R∞. In addition, βAB has no effect on R∞ as evident from the
line which is parallel to the x-axis in Fig. 3 (in red). This is in accordance
with equation 4 which, as noted above, does not include transmission in the
direction LA → LB.
4.3 Limits of the analytic formulation
Overall, it is evident from Fig. 3 that the numeric simulations provide general
support for the analytic solutions; however, there are several discrepancies
which deserve attention and which also give us some insight into the infection
process. First, for very low values of interlayer infection probabilities, the
analytic solutions significantly diverge from the numerical simulations. In
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scenario 2 (Fig. 3b,d), we observe that for the βBA cross-section (blue colour
in the figure) infection probability determines epidemic dynamics in two
ways: (i) a minimal βBA is needed for any outbreak to occur in LA, and (ii)
once this minimal threshold is exceeded, βBA significantly contributes to the
probability and size of outbreaks. We observe a sharp decline at low βBA
values, which does not conform with the analytic solutions. This is because
in the analytic formulation we assume sufficient transmission (assumption
1), which is a condition not met for low parameter values. Once no LB → LA
transmission occurs, no infection occurs in the focal layer.
In scenario 1, sharp declines in outbreak probability and size are observed
for low βBA (Fig. 3a) and βAB, respectively (Fig. 3c). In this scenario, out-
break size and probability in LA are above zero independently of interlayer
transmission, since the source of the epidemic is in LA itself. Therefore,
at very low βBA and βAB values outbreak probability and size have non-
zero baseline values. These baseline values are the non-zero intercepts with
the y-axis, and correspond to the expected dynamics in LA as if it were a
monolayer network (because there is either no LA → LB or no LB → LA
transmission). For any additional contribution from LB, both βBA and βAB
must be non-zero, as disease must transmit back and forth between the lay-
ers to affect LA. Due to assumption 1 (a minimal amount of disease flow
between layers), we see that the analytic formulations may overestimate
disease risk at low transmission rates.
A second type of discrepancy is seen at high interlayer transmission rates
for either βBA in Fig. 3a (red) or for βAB in Fig. 3b,c,d (blue). Here, the
analytic formulations predict a linear relation while the numeric simulations
seem to point to a sub-linear one. One possible explanation for this obser-
vation concerns the expected contribution of the interlayer edges for trans-
mission. The analytic formulations assume that the expected contribution
of each transmitting interlayer edge is additive, since only one transmitting
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edge connects non-giant to giant components (assumption 2), leading to
a linear contribution of the interlayer probabilities to outbreak probability
and size. However, when transmissibility is high enough, some interlayer
edges which transmit the disease may connect to the same non-giant com-
ponent, violating the assumption of additive contribution to outbreak size
and probability, resulting in sublinear contribution to infection in LA.
5 Discussion
In this paper we have applied analytic and numeric analysis to investigate
the outcomes of disease spread in interconnected networks under asymmetric
infection probabilities. Our approach was motivated by the ecology and epi-
demiology of multihost diseases and we tracked disease outcomes in a focal
host while considering the influence of a second host. We have shown that
asymmetry in interlayer infection probabilities and the source of infection
are both important factors in determining disease dynamics. For exam-
ple, outbreak probability and size were affected differently by the source
of infection, emphasizing the importance of considering different measures
of disease risk, and a more detailed understanding of the mechanisms that
underlie them. We discuss our results in the context of disease ecology and
multilayer network theory.
We find that the dynamics in the focal host depends on whether the
disease originated in this host itself or in the non-focal host. Many mod-
els of multihost pathogen transmission in disease ecology consider a target
species infected by a reservoir source (disease originates in LB and βAB →
0; e.g., [13, 22]). In the simulations, we assumed a constant maximum
within-species infection probability and thus examine the continuum be-
tween emerging infectious diseases such as influenza (βBA ≈ 0) and true mul-
tihost diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease (βAB ≈ βBA ≈ βAA ≈ βBB)
[13, 25]. On this continuum (and when the disease originates in the non-
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focal host), our results are consistent with previous studies as we show that
the role of βAB is minor in determining outbreak probability and size (see
horizontal cross-sections in Fig. 3).
Note that in the case where between-host and within-host infection prob-
abilities are equal (a true multihost pathogen; [13]), dynamics will be deter-
mined only by the distribution of interlayer and intralayer edges. Dynamics
in this class of network topology has been explored thoroughly in the con-
text of network community structure (see [3] for a review), but represent a
particular case of the more general epidemic behaviour we investigate here,
which is more relevant for disease ecology.
While one-way transmission models are particularly relevant for zoonotic
diseases, where identifying the source of infection has been a major endeav-
our [18], the distinction between source and target hosts is blurred for many
parasites which can switch between host species. For example, cowpox virus
can infect both bank voles (Clethrionomys glareolus) and wood mice (Apode-
mus sylvaticus), with different infection probabilities [37] and humans and
apes share several pathogens [38]. Indeed, any infection probability is unique
to a host-pathogen combination and a result of ecological, epidemiological
and evolutionary processes [39–42]. Therefore, there are several host traits
which cause among-host heterogeneity in infection probability to a given
parasite [43]. Accordingly, our results show that considering between-host
infection probabilities in both directions is crucial for disease outcomes. In
addition, the qualitative difference in behaviour of outbreak size and prob-
ability (in relation to the source of infection) highlights the need to include
two-way infections and consider the source of infection in future models. It
also has some empirical support. For example, work on the shift of Mi-
crobotryum violaceum, the causal agent of anther-smut disease, between
plant species of the genus Silene has shown that the transmission of the
pathogen in both directions between the new and old plant hosts increases
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disease prevalence in both host plants [44], supporting our theoretical re-
sults.
Regardless of the host of origin, the non-focal host serves as an amplifier
of the disease, in the sense that an increase in species diversity increases
disease risk (here measured as outbreak probability and size) [23]. This is
clearly evident from equations 2, 3 and 4 which have two additive terms.
However, the contribution of the non-focal host to epidemic size depends
mainly on the transmissibility in the direction LB → LA. Another way in
which the non-focal host functions as a disease amplifier is that epidemio-
logical cases in the focal host are not necessarily linked. This is because in
networks, unlike in mean-field models, there are alternative routes for the
infection to spread by carrying the disease to parts of the focal host network
where it has not reached or would not have reached by infection within the
focal host alone. This phenomenon becomes more likely with increasing
between-species transmission.
Our study also has implications for the more general field of network
science. Previous theoretical studies of epidemic spread in interconnected
networks have focused on topological patterns that enable disease establish-
ment (i.e., R0 > 1), while assuming symmetry in interlayer infection prob-
abilities [5–7, 27, 28, 36]. Only one study that we know of has addressed
asymmetric rates of infection between two networks [35] but the authors in-
vestigated an analytic solution to the combination of infection probabilities
that allows crossing the epidemic threshold (R0 > 1), and not the explicit
effect of asymmetry on the disease outcomes. Our study advances the theory
of diffusion in interconnected networks as it emphasizes that asymmetry in
interlayer infection probabilities can change the expected diffusion dynam-
ics due to a joint effect with the source of infection on epidemic size and
probability.
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Conclusions
We find that epidemic size and probability, two proxies for disease risk,
depend on particular configurations of two-way transmission between host
networks. However, models of disease dynamics in disease ecology usually
consider only one-way transmission. Hence, we believe that the study of
interconnected multihost network systems will contribute to a better un-
derstanding of disease dynamics in multihost systems on the one hand and
advance the theoretical understanding of epidemic spread in multilayer net-
work on the other. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain good data which
include both within- and between-population contacts as well as information
on infection probabilities. Such data is needed to corroborate theoretical re-
sults, and we emphasize the importance of data collection and the generation
of multi-species data sets.
We suggest that future models investigate two-way disease transmis-
sion which involves asymmetric infection probabilities. This is very relevant
for diseases that affect non-human organisms but we should also remember
that pathogens can also be transmitted from humans to other hosts and
that in some diseases several hosts are involved in addition to humans [17].
Moreover, identifying the source of infection is crucial. For example, if the
pathogen is endemic in a focal host but infections are usually, (but not nec-
essarily) sub-clinical, then a disease can originate in the focal host itself and
then be amplified by a reservoir.
Finally, our results also have consequences for spreading processes in non-
disease systems. For example, in social multilayer networks information can
flow among different layers (e.g., between different online social networks)
in a non-symmetric fashion. Our study is therefore relevant for the general
theory of diffusion in multilayer networks and it will be valuable to explore
additional consequences of asymmetry in interlayer diffusion probabilities.
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βBA
βAB
Host A Host B
Fig. 1 A multilayer interconnected network between hosts A (left side)
and B (right side). Intralayer edges (in black) represent contacts between indi-
viduals of the same host species. Interlayer edges (in orange) represent contacts
between individuals of different host species. Infection probabilities between hosts
A and B (βAB and βBA) may be asymmetric (represented by different width of
orange arrows). Individuals can be susceptible (black nodes), infected (red nodes)
or recovered (blue nodes).
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Infection probability from layer A to B (βAB)
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Fig. 2 Disease dynamics as a function of source of infection and inter-
layer infection probabilities. Panels (a) and (b) depict the probability that a
disease would infect at least 10% of the individuals in LA (Pe), when the disease
originates in LA and LB , respectively. Panels (c) and (d) depict the mean num-
ber of individuals infected in those simulations that have passed the 10% threshold
(R∞) when the disease originates in LA and LB , respectively. The values of Pe and
R∞ in the plots are a function of the infection probabilities βAB and βBA. Note
that selecting a threshold other than 10% does not change the results.
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Interlayer infection probability (βAB or βBA)
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Fig. 3 Comparison of analytic and simulation results. Red and blue colours
represent cross-sections across βBA = 0.01 (red) and βAB = 0.01 (blue) in the
βAB − βBA parameter space from Figure 2. Solid lines are analytic solutions and
closed circles are simulation results. Panels (a) and (b) depict the probability of
an outbreak in LA (denoted as PA for analytic solutions and Pe for simulations in
the main text). Panels (c) and (d) depict the mean outbreak size in LA (denoted
as RA∞ for analytic solutions and R∞ for simulations in the main text). In panels
(a) and (c) the disease originates in LA (scenario 1), whereas in panels (b) and (d)
it originates in LB (scenario 2). Analytic solutions are shown in equations 2, 3, 4
and the Supplementary Information. In (b) and (d) the Y-intercept of the numeric
results for βAB = 0.01 (blue) is at zero (not shown for clarity).
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Supplementary Information
Size of giant and non-giant components under percolation pro-
cess in arbitrary random networks in the supercritical phase
In this supplement we present the formulation of the expected size of giant
components and expected mean size of non-giant components in random
networks following bond percolation in the network, in the supercritical
regime. These sizes correspond to the expected extent of SIR epidemics
(above the percolation threshold) in the network, either when an outbreak
occurs (giant component) or when it doesn’t (non-giant component). The
derivation of the size of the giant component was shown by Newman [31]
and we reproduce the result here in the context of our work. We also show
the derivation of the mean size of the non-giant component using methods
similar to those employed in [31].
We consider a random network with degree distribution D, for which the
mean degree is z =< D >; we will denote the generating function of D as
G0(x). We now select an edge at random, and select randomally one node
incident to that edge, and count the number of neighbours of that node,
excluding the node connected to the edge we selected initialy. As shown by
Newman [31], the distribution of these counts is
Q(x = k) =
(k + 1)D(x = k + 1)∑
j
jD(x = j)
(SI.1)
with a mean of < Q >= <D
2>−<D>
<D> ; thus, the average number of nodes
two steps away from a randomly selected node is z2 =< D
2 > − < D >.
We denote the generating function of Q as G1(x). By definition
G1(x) =
∞∑
k=0
Q(x = k)xk =
G′0(x)
z
(SI.2)
24
Sizes of giant and non-giant components in random networks
First we find the distribution of non-giant components in networks without
a giant component. These are very small components with only a few nodes,
and it can be safely assumed (unless the network is extremely dense) that
these components do not include loops (i.e., they are tree-like). We now
choose a random edge and a node incident to it as before, and count the
neighbors of this node excluding the node connected to the initially selected
edge (so it is the size of the neighborhood minus one). Let H1(x) be the
generating function of the distribution of sizes of these components. Since we
can continue to follow edges in this ways and sum the number of reachable
nodes at each level, as there are no self-loops, we can define the generating
function recursively:
H1(x) =
∞∑
k=0
Q(x = k)[H1(x)]
k = xG1(H1(x)) (SI.3)
Here we use the fact that the sum of n independent random variables
with the same distribution can be found by observing the nth power of the
generating function of the distribution. The distribution of component sizes
in this case, H0(x), is found by selecting a node at random and quantifying
the size of the component of that node by following the edges connected to
the node, which have distribution D :
H0(x) =
∞∑
k=0
D(x = k)[H1(x)]
k = xG0(H1(x)) (SI.4)
Solving equations SI.3 and SI.4 gives us the generating function of com-
ponent sizes when no giant component exists, and the mean component size
can then be found by evaluating the derivative of the generating function
H ′0(x) at x = 1.
When a giant component does exist (which is the scenario of interest in
our case), evaluating H0(x) at x = 1 will give us the total fraction of the
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network occupied by non-giant components. Therefore, the size of the giant
component is simply
S = 1−H0(1) (SI.5)
To find the mean size of the non-giant components we must normalize
the derivative of the generating function with the fraction of the network
occupied by the non-giant components, H0(1):
s =
H ′0(1)
H0(1)
(SI.6)
Size of giant component under bond percolation
Under bond percolation with transmissiblity T , we simply remove edges
from the network with probability 1− T and evaluate the sizes of the com-
ponent in the resulting network. Thus, the degree distributions need to
be reformulated to generate the correct generating functions equivalent to
equations SI.3 and SI.4. Since the number of edges remaining connected for
each node is binomaly distributed with parameter T , the new generating
functions are [45]:
GT0 (x) =
∞∑
m=0
∞∑
k=m
D(x = k)
(
k
m
)
Tm(1−T )k−mxm = G0(1+(x−1)T ) (SI.7)
and similarly
GT1 (x) = G1(1 + (x− 1)T ). (SI.8)
Exchanging G0(x) and G1(x) for G
T
0 (x) and G
T
1 (x) in equations SI.3
and SI.4 results in the following generating functions:
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HT1 (x) = 1− T + TxG1(HT1 (x)) (SI.9)
and
HT0 (x) = xG0(H
T
1 (x)) (SI.10)
The size of the giant component, S, under the bond percolation process,
which is the size of an outbreak if an outbreak occurs, can be found by
solving equations SI.5 and SI.9 (v = HT1 (1)):
S = 1−G0(v) and v = 1− T + TG1(v) (SI.11)
Mean size of non-giant components under bond percolation
We will proceed to the derivation of the mean size of the non-giant compo-
nents along similar lines. From equation SI.6 we have that the mean size of
the giant components is
s =
HT0
′
(1)
HT0 (1)
(SI.12)
For the nominator we have (equation SI.10)
HT0 (1) = G0
(
HT1 (1)
)
= G0(v) (SI.13)
with the same v found in the solution to equation SI.11. For the denom-
inator we find the derivative:
HT0
′
(x) = G0
(
HT1 (x)
)
+ xHT1
′
(x)G′0
(
HT1 (x)
)
(SI.14)
and so
HT0
′
(1) = G0(v) +H
T
1
′
(1)G′0(v) (SI.15)
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To find HT1
′
(x) we take the derivative of equation SI.9:
HT1
′
(x) = TG1
(
HT1 (x)
)
+ TxHT1
′
(x)G′1
(
HT1 (x)
)
(SI.16)
Now for x = 1
HT1
′
(1) = TG1
(
HT1 (1)
)
+ THT1
′
(1)G′1
(
HT1 (1)
)
= TG1(v) + TH
T
1
′
(1)G′1(v) (SI.17)
Finally we can find HT1
′
(1) by solving (u = HT1
′
(1)):
u = TG1(v) + TuG
′
1(v) (SI.18)
From equations SI.12, SI.13 and SI.15 (with the solution to SI.18) we obtain
the mean size of the non-giant components
s =
G0(v) + uG
′
0(v)
G0(v)
= 1 +
uG′0(v)
G0(v)
= 1 +
uzG1(v)
1− S (SI.19)
Explicit solutions for component sizes in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi net-
works
Solutions for equations SI.11 and SI.19 are generally found using numerical
methods, but for the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network we can find explicit solutions.
These explicit solutions are used for comparison with the simulation analy-
sis in the main text, and are shown in Fig. 3. Derivations of these solutions
from the formulation above is straightforward. In the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi ran-
dom networks the degree distribution follows a Poisson distribution with
parameter z (the mean degree). Thus, the generating function of the degree
distribution in this case is G0(x) = e
z(x−1). Substituting in equation SI.2
we find that G1(x) = e
z(x−1). From equation SI.11
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v = 1− T + Tez(v−1) and S = 1− ez(v−1) (SI.20)
The solution to this equation is
S = 1− ez(1−T−W0(−Tze
−Tz)
z
−1) (SI.21)
where W0 is the main branch of the Lambert W function. We can now
solve u using equation SI.18:
u = − 1
z
(
1 + 1
W0(−Tze−Tz)
) (SI.22)
The mean size of the giant component can be found by substituting u in
equation SI.19 and using v from the solution to equation SI.20:
s = 1− G1(v)
(1− S)z
(
1 + 1
W0(−Tze−Tz)
) (SI.23)
Therefore, the probability of an outbreak occurring in an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
network with mean degree z from a single infected individual is the prob-
ability for belonging to the giant component, S (equation SI.21), and the
expected size of the outbreak is also S. If an outbreak does not occur, it is
expected that only s (equation SI.23) individuals will become infected.
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